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Abstract 
An important, but under-researched, question in relation to policies funding networks of innovators is: 
what kind of innovation networks should be supported, if the policy objective is not just to sponsor 
successful innovation projects, but also to encourage the participants to form networks with desirable 
characteristics? Focusing on a set of policy programmes implemented by the regional government of 
Tuscany, in Italy, between 2002 and 2008, aimed at funding networks of collaborating organisations, 
we investigate whether the imposition of requirements on the composition of the networks that would 
be eligible for funding – in particular, the demand that networks should comply with minimum size and 
heterogeneity thresholds – influenced the participants’ networking behaviour in the context of 
successive policy interventions. Our results show that these requirements immediately affected the size 
and composition of the project networks that applied for funding, although not always in the intended 
direction. However, these effects did not extend to the successive periods, when those requirements 
were no longer in force. This suggests that the imposition of policy requirements, per se, is unlikely to 
induce persistent changes in organizations’ networking behaviour. Other approaches such as 
implementing outreach actions in order to encourage new organisations to participate in existing 
innovation networks and to form new ones, and additional measures designed to foster learning 
opportunities for the participants, might be more effective tools to influence the networking behaviour 
of participating organisations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Alongside traditional research and development (R&D) policy interventions targeted 
at individual firms, policymakers are increasingly supporting the formation of 
innovation networks (such as R&D consortia, networks of excellence, university-
industry partnerships) among firms and other types of organisations. Particularly since 
the early 2000s, numerous policy interventions of this kind have been implemented at 
national and regional levels (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 
2002; Caloghirou et al., 2004; Cunningham and Ramlogan, 2012; Crespi and 
Quatraro, 2013). At supra-national level, the EU Framework Programmes (FP) have 
provided funding to networks of cooperating organisations for almost three decades 
(Breschi and Malerba, 2009; Tindemans, 2009; Biggiero and Angelini, 2014). 
The stated objectives of policies directed at innovation networks are usually to 
support joint R&D, technology transfer activities or even, sometimes, networking per 
se, with a view to create a critical mass of experts or users in a certain discipline or 
technological area - as in the networks of excellence funded in the EU FPs 6 and 7 
(Musiolik et al., 2012). These policy interventions also allow participating 
organisations to gain experience in networking with external partners and in 
collaborating with them on a specific activity, which may affect their ability to engage 
in further innovation networks. While such behavioural effects are not generally 
considered the main objectives of these policies, they could constitute important 
outcomes, since they have the potential to generate long-lasting beneficial changes in 
the participants’ competences and abilities (Clarysse et al., 2009; Duso et al., 2010). 
The interest in the behavioural effects of policy interventions in support of innovation 
networks fits with the recent debate on ‘behavioural additionality’. This concept was 
introduced by Buisseret et al. (1995) to capture the effect of a policy intervention on a 
firm’s (or another organisation’s) way of undertaking R&D, as opposed to the 
established concept of input additionality, which simply captured a policy’s effect on 
the amount of R&D that an organisation engaged in. Over time, the concept has been 
expanded and refined, for example by Georghiou (1998) who suggested that these 
changes should be permanent in character and should allow for more efficient 
innovation performance (see Gok and Edler, 2012, for a review). Within the broad 
realm of behavioural additionality, more specific concepts have also been introduced 
to capture particular kinds of behavioural changes induced by policy interventions, 
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such as ‘network additionality’, intended as the ability of public funding instruments 
to increase networking and co-operation to a greater extent than would be present 
without such funding (Hyvarinen and Rautiainen, 2007), and ‘cognitive capacity 
additionality’ to capture the increase in an organisation’s capabilities to engage in 
successful innovation (Bach and Matt, 2002, 2005). 
While there has been some recent interest in the behavioural effects of policies in 
support of innovation networks (Fier et al., 2006; Chávez, 2011; Antonioli et al., 
2014; Caloffi et al., 2015) the field is still relatively new. In particular, an important 
question for policy design is what kind of networks should be supported, if the 
objective of the policy is not just to fund successful innovation projects, but also to 
influence the participants’ networking behaviour, enabling them to form networks 
with desirable features. 
Many of the policy interventions that we observe in practice require the participants to 
comply with a number of relational features that are deemed to be conducive to 
successful collaborative innovation. For instance, policies funding networks of 
organizations tasked with realizing specific innovation projects often require each 
network to include a minimum number of SMEs and universities.  However, the 
implications in terms of policy design may not be straightforward. In fact, imposing 
specific requirements on networks ‘by design’ may be counterproductive, 
encouraging participants to comply with rules that may not meet their specific needs 
and, ultimately, may decrease their opportunities for learning and networking. 
In this study we investigate whether, by imposing requirements on the design of 
innovation networks, a policy intervention can affect the networking behaviour of 
participating organisations. In particular, we explore whether policy requirements 
induce organisations to set up networks with desirable features not only in order to 
apply to programs where these requirements are present, but also in the context of 
subsequent programs, where the requirements are removed. 
Our empirical analysis builds upon a rich original dataset of all the organisations 
participating in a set of regional policy interventions implemented in the Italian region 
of Tuscany between 2002 and 2008. These interventions competitively allocated 
funding for the realisation of innovative projects carried out by networks of 
organisations: each project proposal had to be submitted by a purposefully created 
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(and legally binding) consortium of organisations based in the region
1
. Initially, some 
of these interventions imposed certain compulsory requirements on the composition 
of the networks that would be eligible for funding (specifically, on the number and 
types of organisations that they should include), while other interventions launched at 
a later stage did not impose any requirements, thereby allowing the participants to 
structure their networks freely.  
As we explain in greater detail in the next sections, our data allow us to compare the 
behaviour of organisations involved in policy programmes where the requirements 
were present with the behaviour of the same organisations in programmes that did not 
include any requirements. In this way, we can observe if the organisations 
participating in the programmes adjusted their behaviour in line with the 
policymakers’ designed requirements, even when such requirements were no longer 
mandatory. Our data do not allow us to determine whether the participants’ behaviour 
has changed outside of the policy context, for example we cannot say whether they 
interact with more or different organisations in other settings. Because of the lack of 
information on the organisations’ overall networking behaviour post-policy, and 
because of the lack of an external control group, the present analysis cannot estimate 
the ‘behavioural additionality’ effects of the policy programme. However, the 
analysis captures some behavioural changes that have been induced by the policy, 
since it tries to capture to what extent the participants have changed their networking 
behaviour when setting up subsequent consortia in order to benefit from public 
funding. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the rationale 
underpinning the imposition of policy requirements in the formation of project 
consortia, and their possible results. In section 3, we describe in some detail the policy 
programmes that are the focus of our analysis. In section 4, we present our 
methodology. In section 5 we present our empirical results, which we discuss in 
section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                 
1
 Innovation networks set up in order to benefit from public funding are usually called ‘consortia’ in 
policy documents. In the rest of this paper, we use the term ‘consortium’ to refer to the legal entity set 
up in order to apply for funding, but we prefer the more general term ‘innovation network’ when 
discussing the networking behaviour of the organisations involved in the set up of these consortia. This 
is because the theoretical arguments about the desirability of certain network characteristics are mainly 
drawn from the organisational literature on innovation networks, and because our findings can be of 
relevance to any scenario in which private or public funders are considering the imposition of 
requirements in the formation of networks of collaborating organisations.  
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2. Policy requirements and networking behaviour 
When designing policies supporting innovation networks, policymakers may impose 
different types of requirements depending on their objectives. Policymakers may wish 
to encourage technology transfer, and therefore choose to fund university-industry 
relationships. They may wish to strengthen the capability for applied research in a 
certain field, and therefore fund large-scale R&D projects with a preponderance of 
universities and research institutions. Or they may wish to encourage SMEs to 
collaborate in R&D and adopt innovations. In this case – as in the programmes 
analysed in the present study - policymakers can impose various requirements on 
network composition. For example, they can require networks to include SMEs, 
which represent the target of their intervention. They can demand the involvement of 
universities, research centres, or intermediaries like technology transfer specialists 
that provide innovation support services. The underlying assumption is that policies 
are needed to stimulate interactions that would not occur spontaneously, but whose 
presence would be desirable (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). Given SMEs’ reluctance 
to embark on collaborative relationships (Bougrain and Haudeville, 2002; Narula, 
2004; Muscio, 2007), policymakers could require networks to include a minimum 
number of participants, with the aim of broadening their connections. In order to 
encourage firms’ openness to external sources of knowledge and to avoid knowledge 
lock-ins, policymakers may require the involvement of extra-regional or international 
participants (Dettman et al., 2012; Antonioli et al., 2014). Table 1 summarizes these 
possible requirements and related policy rationales, building on arguments presented 
by the literature on innovation networks, and presents, by way of illustration, 
examples of policies where such requirements have been imposed. 
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Table 1. Types of policy requirements that can be imposed on the formation of innovation 
networks, and related policy rationales  
Policy requirement Policy rationale Policy including such 
requirement 
Minimum number of 
organisations to be included in 
the network  
A critical mass of resources, 
competencies and relationships 
is needed in order to carry out 
an innovative project 
Japanese policies funding R&D 
consortia (1980-1992); 
(Sakakibara, 1997) 
Organisations of a particular 
nature to be included in the 
network 
Different competencies are 
needed in order to carry out an 
innovative project. 
Saxonian Support Scheme for 
R&D Cooperation (Schwartz et 
al, 2010); German Ministry of 
Education and Research 
Innovationsforen (Dettman et 
al, 2012) 
Organisations based outside the 
region or the country to be 
included in the network 
External organizations could 
help avoid knowledge lock-in 
traps to the extent that they are 
able to bring new knowledge 
and competencies to the 
partnership 
American–Israeli R&D 
alliances supported by Israel–
US Binational Industrial 
Research and Development 
Foundation (Bizan, 2003) 
Organisations can participate in 
more than one network at a time   
Knowledge spillovers from one 
project to another are 
encouraged. Policymakers 
facilitate the emergence of a 
network of innovative networks 
EU framework programmes 
(Breschi and Cusmano, 2004); 
Regional innovation 
programmes in Italy (Tuscany) 
(Russo and Rossi, 2009; 
Bellandi and Caloffi, 2010) 
 
The immediate effect of these requirements is to encourage organisations wishing to 
benefit from public funds to set up networks that meet such requirements. However, 
policymakers often have more complex goals in mind, for example they might wish to 
encourage organisations to persistently adopt collaborative behaviours that are 
potentially conductive to innovation
2
. This approach is consistent with what the 
innovation literature refers to as ‘behavioural additionality’, a concept that captures 
the extent to which participation in a policy intervention results in a persistent change 
in the behaviour of the organisations that have benefited from public funds – in what 
they are doing and in how they are doing it (Buisseret et al., 1995; Clarysse et al., 
2009). In the context of policies supporting innovation networks, an important 
behavioural result would be to encourage the participants to build networks that are 
potentially conductive to innovation, not only in the context of the programme where 
these behaviours are explicitly required, but also beyond. 
In what follows we consider two types of policy requirements for innovation 
networks: the imposition of a minimum number of participants (henceforth referred to 
                                                 
2
 Such more complex goals underpin, for example, several European Commission programmes which 
influence national and regional policies in Europe (see, for instance, the FP7-ICT and CIP ICT-PSP 
programmes, the European Innovation Partnerships, and Horizon 2020). 
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as ‘minimum network size’ requirement) and the requirement to include certain types 
of organisations, thus imposing a minimum amount of heterogeneity in the network’s 
composition (henceforth referred to as ‘minimum heterogeneity’ requirement). We 
can expect these policy requirements to have both negative and positive effects on the 
participants’ networking behaviour.  
On the one hand, as previously noted, requirements may be instrumental in enhancing 
the participants’ ability to form successful networks. It has been suggested that, as 
technologies become more complex and economic environments more uncertain, 
firms increasingly rely upon external sources of knowledge to support their 
technological development (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell et al., 1996). 
Consequently, innovation activities have become more open and distributed, 
involving R&D collaborations, integration of different knowledge modules, and 
transaction of intellectual property (Von Hippel, 1988; Chesbrough, 2003). Studies of 
both organisations and individuals have emphasized that interactions among 
heterogeneous actors are key sources of innovation (Fonseca, 2002; Nooteboom, 
2004). Some features of such interactions are associated with greater likelihood to 
generate innovations and to foster long-lasting relationships that give rise to 
innovation cascades (Lane and Maxfield, 1997). The requirement to include a 
minimum number of partners could encourage the participants to expand their 
network of relationships and become acquainted with numerous organisations that can 
provide them with further networking opportunities. For example, in the case of firms 
trapped in relational lock-ins (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000; Maurer and Ebers, 2006), 
this requirement could help increase the chance to meet new partners, access new 
knowledge and embark on new innovative projects. This in turn could increase firms’ 
likelihood to engage in subsequent networks, and to form larger networks. The 
requirement to include specific types of organisations, thus imposing a minimum 
amount of heterogeneity, could encourage participants to gain experience in initiating 
and managing relationships with partners possessing different competencies, 
cognitive frames and modes of operation. For example, for SMEs trapped in 
knowledge lock-ins or needing to renew their approach to innovation, contacts with 
universities could improve their chance to encounter new knowledge (Malerba, 2009) 
or to exploit existing knowledge (Schoonmaker and Carayannis, 2010; Arroyabe et 
al., 2015). However, it is precisely such companies that are most reluctant to create 
relationships (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1991). Collaborating with a university in the 
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context of an innovative project could help SMEs learn the language, time frames, 
and practices of the university and to overcome some of the barriers that separate 
them. These processes may increase their likelihood to engage in subsequent 
heterogeneous networks. 
On the other hand, policy requirements may have a negative effect on the 
performance of innovation networks, as they impose an additional layer of rules that 
may be misaligned with the participants’ needs. If such rules are irrelevant, they may 
simply increase the transaction costs in the process of network formation. But such 
rules may even be detrimental, if they hamper the networks’ innovative performance 
and learning processes. The minimum network size requirement can result in an 
increase in the number of participants that is not directly motivated by the needs of 
the project. This can create congestion and hamper communications among network 
members, thus reducing project performance. The heterogeneity requirement could 
lead to the inclusion of types of participants that are not necessary for the success of 
the project, and that may even have an adverse impact on it.  
In what follows we will try to explore whether policy requirements induce 
participants to form networks with certain features to a greater extent than they would 
if such constraints were looser, or absent, and whether their effects on participants’ 
networking behaviour manifest beyond the policy intervention in which they are 
applied.   
 
3. The policy interventions 
The empirical analysis focuses on a set of policies supporting networks of innovators 
implemented by the regional government of Tuscany. This regional government has 
been one of the most active promoters of innovation network policies in Italy, with a 
succession of tenders supported by European Regional Development funds (ERDF) 
since the early 2000s (Russo and Rossi, 2009; Bellandi and Caloffi, 2010). In 
particular, in the programming period 2000-2006 it promoted nine consecutive waves 
of four policy programmes aimed at supporting innovative projects carried out by 
networks of organisations: the Regional Programmes of Innovative Action (RPIA) 
implemented in 2002 (ITT – Technological Innovation in Tuscany), and in 2006 
(VINCI – Promoting innovation networks and virtual organisations), and two lines of 
the Single Programming Document of the Region, namely the line 1.7.1 and the line 
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1.7.2. All these programmes funded innovative projects implemented by consortia 
involving firms and other organisations. The duration of each consortium coincided 
with the duration of the funded project. The projects were carried out between 2002 
and 2008. Our dataset is based primarily on the administrative records held and 
provided by the regional government agency that implemented the policy. It includes 
data on the participants in the eligible projects (location, NACE code, number of 
employees, number of project applications submitted to the programmes, number of 
applications that were funded, funding received, number of times they acted as project 
coordinators, participants or subcontractors), as well as on the characteristics of the 
project applications (policy wave and programme to which they were submitted, 
abstracts of the projects and the technology area they related to, whether they were 
funded or not, amount of funding granted, names and types of participants).  
The policy initiatives were addressed to a regional economic context where SMEs 
with little R&D activity, often operating in sectors affected by harsh international 
competition, are prevalent. In order to promote the upgrading of these firms’ 
innovative skills and the adoption and diffusion of innovation in the region, the 
regional government supported the development of non-transitory forms of 
collaboration among micro enterprises, SMEs, large firms, universities, research 
centres, business services providers and other organisations acting as intermediaries 
(such as innovation centres). 
In the vision of policymakers, these programmes should have led to the development 
and strengthening of innovation clusters made of SMEs and large companies working 
together with innovation service providers, universities and other agents supporting 
innovation. Strongly inspired by the regional innovation system framework – which 
was dominant in the European innovation strategies of the time – the regional 
policymaker considered the emergence of such clusters as the first step towards the 
formation of an innovation system in Tuscany. 
In some of the nine waves, two key types of requirements were imposed: a minimum 
degree of heterogeneity in the composition of the consortia (in particular, the specific 
nature of the organisations that should have been involved in the consortia was 
specified); and a minimum number of partner organisations. The latter requirement 
was aimed at involving a sufficient number of regional organisations so as to set the 
foundations for a regional innovation system, while the former intended to mobilize 
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specific types of organisations that would play a role in this system (SPD 2002-2006 
Objective 2 Tuscany Region, Line 1.7, RPIA 2002 and RPIA 2006). 
We can group the nine policy waves into two distinct periods. The first period 
includes interventions launched between 2002 and 2005, it included the majority of 
waves (three programmes, divided into six waves)
3
 and participants, and absorbed 
45% of the resources assigned to network policies. Out of the six policy waves, five 
were characterized by the imposition of several requirements.  
The second period started with interventions launched between 2006 and 2008. It 
included two programmes, divided into three waves
4
. Interestingly, the last three 
waves had not been planned at the beginning of the programming period. Rather, the 
regional administration was able to procure additional funds that enabled it to 
implement further interventions. In these three waves, no requirements on the 
networks’ composition were imposed. 
Table 2 shows the requirements characterizing the different waves. These 
requirements were in line with the policymaker’s objectives, which were to promote 
the realisation of successful innovation processes and to support learning processes on 
the part of the participants, SMEs in particular. In the policymakers’ intentions (SPD 
2002-2006 Objective 2 Tuscany Region, Line 1.7, RPIA 2002 and RPIA 2006), the 
heterogeneity requirements were instrumental in creating connections between 
organisations that would not have otherwise collaborated and in promoting the 
diffusion of knowledge and technology to those organisations that were perceived to 
be weaker elements in the regional innovation system: by requiring that networks 
involved both knowledge-intensive organisations (universities, public and private 
research centres, innovation centres) and partners that were less knowledge-intensive 
and less accustomed to engaging in collaborative innovation (micro enterprises and 
SMEs), the aim was to foster the transfer of advanced technologies and organisational 
knowledge from the former to the latter. The minimum network size requirements 
were expected to induce those organisations that were already part of established 
networks to open up their partnerships to new organisations, preventing them from 
locking into stable and closed communities. 
                                                 
3
It included: the Regional Programme of Innovative Action issued in 2002 (labelled as 2002_ITT in 
what follows); the SPD line 171 – ‘programme 1.7.1’ – launched in 2002 (2002_171), in 2004 (two 
waves: 2004_171 and 2004_171E, targeting environmental protection technologies), in 2005 
(2005_171); the SPD line 172 – ‘programme 1.7.2’ – issued in 2002 (2002_172). 
4
 The Regional Programme of the Innovative Action issued in 2006 (2006_VIN), and the waves 2007 
and 2008 of the programme 171 (2007_171 and 2008_171). 
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Table 2. Types of requirements in the different waves 
Wave 
Policy 
programme 
Type of requirements: 
Minimum size 
of the 
partnership 
Minimum number of: 
SMEs 
Research 
organisations 
Innovation 
centres 
Local 
governments 
2002_ITT RPIA 2002 5 4 1 
  
2002_171 SPD line 171 5 4 
 
1 
 
2002_172 SPD line 172 6 4 
 
1 1 
2004_171 SPD line 171 4 1 
  
 
2004_171E SPD line 171 
     
2005_171 SPD line 171 10 5 1 
 
1 
2006_VIN RPIA 2006 
     
2007_171 SPD line 171 
     
2008_171 SPD line 171           
 
According to the regional policy-makers and programme managers we interviewed
5
, 
the requirements were included in the policies for educational purposes and in 
particular with the aim of helping SMEs to expand their network of contacts for 
innovation and learn how to build relationships with universities, service providers, 
and other organisations. 
Overall, the nine waves were assigned almost € 37 million, representing around 40% 
of the total funds spent on regional innovation policies in that programming period. 
Half of these funds were assigned to waves funded at 100% (non-repayable 
subsidies), while the rest was administered through co-funding (with shares of non-
repayable subsidies ranging from 75% to 85% of admissible costs). Through the nine 
waves, 298 projects proposals were considered eligible for funding, and 168 of these 
were funded. All projects were peer reviewed and assigned a score, which formed the 
basis for the decision whether to grant funding. The total number of different 
organisations that were involved in funded project proposals in the nine waves was 
1121, a subset of which (352) had taken part in more than one project proposal. Since 
many waves allowed each organisation to participate in more than one project, the 
number of different participation instances amounted to 2003.  
                                                 
5
 The interviews to the policymakers and to the managers of the programmes have been realized by the 
authors over the course of several years, and in particular in 2003-2004, 2005-2006, and 2007. The 
authors were involved in the evaluation of some of the programmes, namely the RPIA implemented in 
2002, the programme 171_2005, and the RPIA launched in 2006. 
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In our analysis we consider the results of requirements on the networking behaviour 
of the 819 organisations that participated in the five waves in the period 2002-2005 
where requirements were imposed (waves 2002_ITT, 2002_171, 2002_172, 
2004_171, 2005_171, as shown in Table 2)
6
. Some of these organizations (201) went 
on to participate also in waves in the period 2006-2008.
7
 Table 3 shows the number 
and distribution by type of participating organisations in the periods considered
8
.  
  
Table 3. Participants by type of organisation 
 Type of organisation 5 waves with policy 
requirements, 2002-
2005 
3 waves without policy 
requirements, 2006-
2008 
5 waves with policy 
requirements, 2002-
2005, and 3 waves 
without policy 
requirements 2006-
2008  
  n. 
participants 
% n. 
participants 
% n. 
participants 
% 
Enterprise (Ent) 471 57.51% 260 55.44% 72 35.82% 
Local business association 
(LA) 
71 8.67% 33 7.04% 23 11.44% 
University or PRO (Uni) 68 8.30% 47 10.02% 27 13.43% 
Local government (LG) 65 7.94% 28 5.97% 18 8.96% 
Business service provider 
(SP) 
58 7.08% 43 9.17% 20 9.95% 
Other public agency (Opub) 32 3.91% 16 3.41% 9 4.48% 
Innovation centre  (IC) 31 3.79% 21 4.48% 18 8.96% 
Private research company 
(PR) 
13 1.59% 10 2.13% 4 1.99% 
Chamber of commerce (CC) 10 1.22% 11 2.35% 10 4.98% 
Total 819 100.00% 469 100.00% 201 100.00% 
Note to table 3: The category ‘enterprise’ includes manufacturing firms and software developers. The 
category ‘university or PRO’ includes universities and public research centres. Innovation centres are 
publicly funded (or funded via public-private partnerships) organisations providing a wide range of 
innovation-related services, while business service providers are private companies providing design, 
marketing, business consultancy and other services to firms. Local associations are business 
associations and other types of trade and professional association among firms. ‘Other public agencies’ 
includes other public bodies such as, for instance, hospitals and medical clinics. 
                                                 
6
 We have excluded wave 2004_171E since it was the only wave in the period 2002-2005 in which no 
requirements on the networks’ composition and size were imposed. This wave was focused only 
environmental issues and funded projects of very limited duration (maximum 4 months). 
7
 Since the fulfillment of minimum size and heterogeneity requirements was a pre-requisite in order to 
be considered eligible for funding, and since in some waves networks size and heterogeneity 
contributed to the projects’ ranking, we decided to focus only on the organisations that took part in 
funded projects, in order to avoid biases arising from the policymakers’ selection process. However, 
we have found that the results presented in section 5 broadly hold also if we run the same analysis on 
the set of funded and non-funded projects (the latter were eligible for funding, having fulfilled all the 
policy requirements, but they were not funded due to having received lower peer review scores). 
8
 The 34 organisations that only participated in wave 2004_171E are excluded from the analysis. 
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4. The empirical strategy 
After describing in greater detail the structure of the policy waves, and after 
presenting some general descriptive statistics on the participating organisations, we 
move on to exploring the results of the policy requirements on the participants’ 
networking behaviour. As mentioned previously, we focus both on the immediate 
results produced by the presence of the requirements, and on the subsequent effects of 
the requirements on the characteristics of networks that were submitted to later policy 
waves, in which requirements were absent.  
As for the analysis of the immediate results, which will be discussed in section 5.1, 
we focus on the effects of requirements on the individual networking behaviour of the 
819 organisations participating in policy waves during the first period (2002-2005), 
by checking whether the average intensity of the policy requirements imposed during 
that period affected the average heterogeneity and size of the networks that each 
organisation participated in. Obviously, the projects applying for funding must 
comply with the requirements imposed by the policies. Therefore, we expect that the 
greater the required heterogeneity and size of the networks an organisation 
participates in, the greater the actual heterogeneity and size of its networks. 
In order to verify whether this is true, we run two regressions where the actual 
heterogeneity (Model 1) and average size (Model 2) of an organisation’s networks in 
the first period (avghet_0205 and avgsize_0205) are explained by the variables 
representing the average minimum heterogeneity (avgminhet) and the average 
minimum size (avgminsize) of the networks the organisation participated in, as 
mandated by the policy requirements. These are average values. In fact, as the 
observed agents can take part in more than one project in the same period, the 
individual measure refers to the heterogeneity and size, on average, of the 
participated projects.  
We measure the heterogeneity of each project network as the reciprocal of the 
Herfindahl index computed on the shares of participants belonging to each of nine 
categories (as listed in Table 3)
9
 . The size of a network is measured by the number of 
                                                 
9
 The reciprocal of the Herfindahl index (Herfindahl, 1982) computed for each project is:  
1/Hj   = 1/ (∑i (xji / Xi
2
) 
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participating organisations. Moreover, we measure the minimum heterogeneity 
requirement of each project network as the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index 
computed on the share of each type of participants required in the relevant wave (as 
indicated in columns 4-7 of Table 2), while the minimum size requirement of each 
project network is measured using the minimum number of partners required in the 
relevant wave (as indicated in column 3 of Table 2). 
We also include four variables capturing the organisation’s networking capabilities: 
the ability to put together successful applications (the number of funded projects the 
organisation participated in, nprojects_0205, the share of project proposals presented 
that were funded, sharefunded_0205) and the ability to take on a central role in the 
projects (the average funding per project the organisation was able to procure, 
avgfunding_0205, whether the organisation coordinated any funded projects, 
coord_0205). We control for the organisation’s type and technological specialization 
of the projects in which was involved (share of projects in each technology area). We 
include these variables because, together with the existence of policy requirements, 
they can help to explain the heterogeneity and the size of the networks. 
The models are estimated in the following linear form: 
i
k
kik
j
jijiiiii vORGNEThetavgcy    avgminsizemin 21  (1) 
where yi is the dependent variable (either avghet_0205 in Model 1 or avgsize_0205 in 
Model 2), avgminhet and avgminsize are respectively the average minimum 
heterogeneity and the average minimum size of the networks the organisation 
participated in during 2002-2005, NETj is a set of four variables measuring the 
networking capabilities of the organisation during 2002-2005, ORGk is a set of 
variables capturing organisational characteristics (seven dummy variables capturing 
the organisation’s type and ten variables capturing the organisation’s technological 
specialization), and vi is an independent and identically distributed normal error term. 
Table 4 reports the main descriptive statistics on the variables used in these models. 
The correlation matrix between these variables is reported in Appendix 1. 
                                                                                                                                           
 where xji is the number of organisations of type i participating in project j, and Xi is the total number of 
organisations participating in project j. This index quantifies how broad is the range of different types 
of organisations that participate in the project, and the relative weight of each type: the more ‘equal’ 
the shares, the higher is the index. A low value of 1/Hj implies that the project is less heterogeneous 
while a high value implies that the project is more heterogeneous. The index takes values between 1 
and n, which is the overall number of types (in this case, the index has an upper bound at n=9). 
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Table 4. Variables used in Models 1 and 2 
 
Number of observations: 819 
Variabile name Variable description Mean σ Min Max 
avgminhet Average minimum heterogeneity of 
networks as mandated by policy 
requirements . It is calculated as the 
reciprocal of the Herfindahl index 
computed on the share of each type of 
participants required in the relevant wave 
(as indicated in columns 4-7 of Table 2) 
1.71 0.19 1.00 2.00 
avgminsize Average minimum size of networks as 
mandated by policy requirements. It is 
calculated as the minimum number of 
partners required in the relevant wave (as 
indicated in column 3 of Table 2). 
8.24 2.24 4.00 10.00 
avghet_0205 Average heterogeneity of funded 
networks the organisation participated in, 
2002-2005. It is calculated as the 
reciprocal of the Herfindahl index 
computed on the shares of participants 
belonging to each of nine categories 
presented in Table 3. 
3.41 1.02 1.18 5.95 
avgsize_0205 Average size of funded networks the 
organisation participated in, 2002-2005. 
The size of the network is measured by 
the number of participating organisations.  
22.18 6.88 4.00 37.00 
      
nprojects_0205 Overall number of funded projects the 
organisation participated in, 2002-2005 
1.51 1.28 1.00 14.00 
sharefunded_0205 Share of funded projects in 2002-2005 0.89 0.21 0.13 1.00 
avgfunding_0205 Average funding per project obtained by 
the organisation in 2002-2005 
8017 17500 0.00 266425 
coord_0205 Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation has 
coordinated any funded projects in 2002-
2005 
0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Ent Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is 
an Enterprise 
0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LA Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
Local business association 
0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Uni Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
University or PRO 
0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
LG Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
Local government 
0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
SP Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
Business service provider 
0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Opub Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is 
an Other public agency 
0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
IC Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is 
an Innovation centre 
0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
shareICT Share of projects in ICT 0.52 0.43 0.00 1.00 
shareOpto Share of projects in optoelectronics 0.11 0.29 0.00 1.00 
shareMEch Share of projects in mechanics 0.05 0.18 0.00 1.00 
shareOrgChem Share of projects in organic chemistry 0.04 0.16 0.00 1.00 
shareBiotech Share of projects in biotechnology 0.05 0.19 0.00 1.00 
shareNew Share of projects in new technologies 0.05 0.19 0.00 1.00 
shareMulti Share of projects in multiple areas 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.00 
shareNano Share of projects in nanotechnology 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
shareGeo Share of projects in geothermal energy 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.50 
shareOther Share of projects in other areas 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.00 
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In terms of subsequent results, discussed in section 5.2, we test whether the policy 
requirements in the first period (2002-2005) impacted on the participants’ networking 
behaviour in the second period (2006-2008), when no requirements were imposed on 
the networks’ composition. 
We consider the set of 201 organisations that participated in both the first and the 
second periods and we examine whether the average required heterogeneity and size 
of the organization’s funded project proposals in the first period influenced the 
average heterogeneity – avghet_0608 – (Model 3) and the average size – 
avgsize_0608 – (Model 4) of the project proposals funded in the second period. We 
control for four variables capturing the organisation’s networking capabilities (the 
number of funded projects the organisation participated in, nprojects_0608, the share 
of project proposals presented that were funded, sharefunded_0608, the average 
funding per project the organisation was able to procure, avgfunding_0608, the share 
of funded projects which the organisation coordinated, sharecoord_0608), and for the 
organisation’s type and technological specialization (share of projects in each 
technology area). 
The models are estimated in the following linear form: 
i
k
kik
j
jijiiiii vORGNEThetavgcy    avgminsizemin 21  (2) 
where yi is the dependent variable (either avghet_0608 in Model 3 or avgsize_0608 in 
Model 4), avgminhet and avgminsize are respectively the average minimum 
heterogeneity and the average minimum size of the networks the organisation 
participated in during 2002-2005, NETj is the set of four variables measuring the 
networking capabilities of the organisation during 2006-2008, ORGk is a set of 
variables capturing organisational characteristics (the same as in models 1 and 2), and 
vi is an independent normal error term. 
Table 5 reports the main descriptive statistics on the variables used in these models. 
The correlation matrix between these variables is reported in Appendix 2. 
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Table 5. Variables used in Models 3 and 4 
 
 
Number of observations: 201 
Variabile name Variable description Mean σ Min Max 
avgminhet Average minimum heterogeneity of 
projects as mandated by policy 
requirements. It is calculated as the 
reciprocal of the Herfindahl index 
computed on the share of each type of 
participants required in the relevant wave 
(as indicated in columns 4-7 of Table 2) 
1.74 0.16 1.00 2.00 
avgminsize Average minimum size of projects as 
mandated by policy requirements. It is 
calculated as the minimum number of 
partners required in the relevant wave (as 
indicated in column 3 of Table 2). 
8.69 1.77 4.00 10.00 
avghet_0608 Average heterogeneity of funded 
networks the organisation participated in, 
2006-2008. It is calculated as the 
reciprocal of the Herfindahl index 
computed on the shares of participants 
belonging to each of nine categories 
presented in Table 3. 
2.85 1.15 1.00 6.76 
avgsize_0608 Average size of funded networks the 
organisation participated in, 2006-2008. 
The size of the network is measured by 
the number of participating organisations. 
9.95 3.23 4.00 18.00 
nprojects_0608  Number of funded projects the 
organisation participated in 2006-2008 
1.83 1.26 1.00 8.00 
sharefunded_0608 Share of funded projects in 2006-2008 0.87 0.22 0.20 1.00 
avgfunding_0608 Average funding per project obtained by 
the organisation in 2006-2008 
32645 39697 0.00 240793 
coord_0608 Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation has 
coordinated any funded projects in 2006-
2008 
0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Ent Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is 
an Enterprise 
0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
LA Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
Local business association 
0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Uni Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
University or PRO 
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
LG Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
Local government 
0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
SP Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is a 
Business service provider 
0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Opub Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is 
an Other public agency 
0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
IC Dummy equal to 1 if the organisation is 
an Innovation centre 
0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
shareICT Share of projects in ICT 0.48 0.29 0.00 1.00 
shareOpto Share of projects in optoelectronics 0.08 0.21 0.00 1.00 
shareMEch Share of projects in mechanics 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.67 
shareOrgChem Share of projects in organic chemistry 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.50 
shareBiotech Share of projects in biotechnology 0.04 0.14 0.00 1.00 
shareNew Share of projects in new technologies 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 
shareMulti Share of projects in multiple areas 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.50 
shareNano Share of projects in nanotechnology 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.40 
shareGeo Share of projects in geothermal energy 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.50 
shareOther Share of projects in other areas 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.67 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. The immediate results of policy requirements 
 
The following figure 1 shows the heterogeneity and size of networks in a scatter 
diagram that distinguishes between waves with and without requirements. This 
representation shows that the size and heterogeneity of networks were, on average, 
greater when requirements were present (the average network size was 19.09 in waves 
with requirements, and 7.81 in waves without requirements; the average network 
heterogeneity was 3.38 in waves with requirements and 2.54 in waves without 
requirements). In waves with requirements, however, network heterogeneity exhibited 
lower variability in relation to the mean and displayed a smaller range of values, than 
in waves without requirements; the opposite occurred for network size, which was 
more variable and displayed a larger range of values in waves with requirements than 
in waves without requirements. 
 
Figure 1. Size and heterogeneity of project networks, grouped according to presence or absence 
of requirements 
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To assess the immediate results of policy requirements on organisations’ networking 
behaviour, we have implemented two econometric models that take organisations as 
the units of analysis and explore  the influence of the average minimum heterogeneity 
(avgminhet) and the average minimum size (avgminsize) of the projects the 
organisation participated in, as mandated by the policy requirements, on, respectively, 
the average heterogeneity (Model 1) and average size (Model 2) of its networks. The 
results are reported in Table 6
10
.  
 
Table 6. Estimates for Models 1 and 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable avghet_0205 avgsize_0205 
  Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
avgminhet -0.493** -9.765*** 
 (0.244) (2.142) 
avgminsize 0.246*** 1.852*** 
 (0.0211) (0.177) 
nprojects_0205 -0.0136 -0.0744 
 (0.0185) (0.107) 
sharefunded_0205 -0.565*** -0.593 
 (0.202) (1.469) 
avgfunding_0205 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
coord_0205 -0.170 -0.805 
 (0.115) (0.726) 
Ent -0.462*** 1.500 
 (0.146) (1.145) 
LA -0.114 2.675** 
 (0.161) (1.208) 
Uni -0.132 2.418* 
 (0.166) (1.257) 
LG -0.280 4.265*** 
 (0.181) (1.204) 
SP 0.370** 0.615 
 (0.176) (1.406) 
Opub 0.174 3.125** 
 (0.205) (1.421) 
IC 0.127 5.022*** 
 (0.190) (1.634) 
Tech. specializations significant significant 
constant 2.806*** 19.24*** 
  (0.400) (3.551) 
N. observations 819 819 
F 32.98 27.56 
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.416 0.370 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
10
 The models were estimated with robust standard errors due to the Breusch-Pagan tests rejecting the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in Model 2 (Chi2 = 12.6, p-value = 0.001) although not in Model 1 
(Chi2 = 1.6, p-value = 0.21). Although there is a relatively high correlation between avgminhet and 
avgminsize (0.74) the analysis of the variance inflation factors for these variables (2.45 and 2.84 
respectively) suggests that multicollinearity is not problematic in these models. 
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The regressions on the variables avghet_0205 and avgsize_0205 show that policy 
requirements significantly influence the heterogeneity and size of the networks each 
organisation participates in: the variable avgminsize has a positive and significant 
coefficient in both Model 1 and Model 2, indicating that participating in networks 
that, on average, have higher minimum size requirements leads organisations to form 
larger and more heterogeneous networks. Instead, the variable avgminhet has a 
negative and significant coefficient in both Model 1 and Model 2, indicating that 
participating in networks that, on average, have higher minimum heterogeneity 
requirements leads organisations to form less heterogeneous and smaller networks. 
This is a counterintuitive result that we discuss in greater detail later. 
Firms are involved in less heterogeneous networks, while business service providers 
take part in more heterogeneous ones. This is consistent with business service 
providers playing an intermediary role between other organisations in the networks 
(Caloffi et al., 2015) and hence being instrumental in supporting greater 
heterogeneity. Firms instead entered the networks mainly as technology users, sharing 
this role with other firms. Local associations, innovation centres, local governments, 
universities and other public organisations are involved in larger networks. Greater 
success in preparing project applications (share of funded projects) and having a more 
central role in the projects (average funding) are linked to lower heterogeneity and 
smaller size. This suggests that, in this first period, participants that were more 
central, and presumably more experienced, in project management preferred joining 
more homogeneous and smaller networks, despite the opposite incentives provided by 
the policy.  
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5.2. The subsequent results of policy requirements 
The results of Models 3 and 4 are reported in Table 7
11
. Here, we consider the set of 
201 organisations that participated in both periods (2002-2005 and 2006-2008) and 
we explore the effects of the average minimum heterogeneity (avgminhet) and the 
average minimum size (avgminsize) of the projects the organisation participated in 
during the first period, as required by the policy requirements, on the average 
heterogeneity (avghet_0608) and average size (avgsize_0608) of its networks in the 
second period. 
Models 3 and 4 suggest that the average minimum heterogeneity and/or average 
minimum size requirements did not influence the average heterogeneity or the 
average size of an organization’s networks in the second period. This may suggest 
that organisations may not consider heterogeneity per se as a valuable attribute of 
project networks, but rather only value when it is indeed necessary for the project’s 
success.  
Considering both models, greater average funding is negatively associated with 
average network heterogeneity and average network size, like in Models 1 and 2, 
while having a greater share of funded project proposals is positively associated with 
average network heterogeneity and average network size. Like in the previous period, 
organisations that took on a more central role in the management of the projects 
tended to be involved in smaller and less heterogeneous networks, while in the second 
period organisations that were more successful at preparing project applications 
tended to take part in larger and more heterogeneous networks. These findings could 
suggest the presence of a core of leading actors that often collaborated across the 
different policy waves, surrounded by a number of very active organisations who 
continued to start new networks. This structure would be consistent with the 
oligarchic network identified by Breschi and Cusmano (2004) in the case of the EU 
Framework Programmes. Finally, universities, innovation centres, local governments, 
associations, business service providers and other public agencies on average 
participated in more heterogeneous networks. 
 
                                                 
11
 The models were estimated with robust standard errors due to the Breusch-Pagan tests rejecting the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in Model 3 (Chi2 = 6.40, p-value = 0.01) although not in Model 4 
(Chi2 = 0.91, p-value = 0.34). Although there is a relatively high correlation between avgminhet and 
avgminsize (0.62) the analysis of the variance inflation factors for these variables (1.90 and 2.09 
respectively) suggests that multicollinearity is not problematic in these models. 
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Table 7. Estimates for Models 3 and 4  
 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable: avghet_0608 avgsize_0608 
 Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
avgminhet -0.537 -0.667 
 (0.624) (2.025) 
avgminsize 0.0889 0.0294 
 (0.0600) (0.189) 
nprojects_0608 -0.0667 0.0732 
 (0.0620) (0.169) 
sharefunded_0608 0.439 3.118** 
 (0.443) (1.317) 
avgfunding_0608 -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
coord_0608 0.203 -0.265 
 (0.254) (0.722) 
Ent 0.398 -0.0180 
 (0.404) (0.594) 
LA 1.155** -0.332 
 (0.450) (0.925) 
Uni 1.397*** 0.627 
 (0.455) (0.839) 
LG 1.216*** -0.336 
 (0.448) (0.781) 
SP 1.116** -0.0563 
 (0.464) (0.975) 
Opub 1.640*** -0.824 
 (0.579) (1.003) 
IC 1.208*** -0.950 
 (0.454) (0.954) 
Technology specializations significant significant 
constant 2.200* 7.364** 
 (1.184) (3.481) 
N. observations 201 201 
F 6.913 2.804 
Prob>F 0.000   0.000 
R-squared  0.323 0.230 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6. Discussion 
Our empirical analysis has shown that the imposition of requirements on the size and 
composition of networks to be submitted for funding had a controversial influence on 
the characteristics of the networks that were actually formed. Obviously, in order to 
be eligible for funding, the agents tried to meet the policy requirements. However, 
this effect was limited to the waves in which the requirement was imposed and did not 
extend to the subsequent waves. In particular, the minimum network size requirement 
appears to have induced organisations to form larger and more heterogeneous 
networks: the greater, on average, the size of the network that was required, the larger 
and more heterogeneous were, on average, the networks the organisation participated 
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in. Such requirement appears to have pushed organisations to network with a greater 
number of other organisations and with a more varied range of organisations as well. 
Once the requirement was removed in the second period, however, organisations 
returned to forming smaller networks (as shown in Figure 1, average network size 
was smaller in programmes without requirements) and indeed the average minimum 
size requirement imposed in the first period did not affect the average size of an 
organisation’s networks in the second period. This suggests that participants did not 
find that being involved in larger networks to be, per se, was particularly valuable 
(this is confirmed by the fact that more experienced participants that took on a more 
central role in the projects, tended to be involved in smaller networks, on average), 
although being part of larger networks in the first period allowed them to establish 
contacts which may provide useful in other contexts and at future points in time. 
The immediate result that participation in programmes with tighter minimum 
heterogeneity requirements is negatively correlated with the heterogeneity of the 
networks presented can appear counterintuitive. A possible explanation for this 
apparently puzzling result is that the specification of more stringent requirement may 
have discouraged participants from including in their networks organisations that 
were different from the types recommended by the policymaker; that is, when 
confronted with very specific requirements, participants followed the guidelines for 
network composition quite closely and avoided including other types of organisations. 
This, paradoxically, led them to form networks that were less heterogeneous than 
those they may have formed had the requirement been looser. This interpretation is 
consistent with the observation that in programmes where heterogeneity requirements 
were present, the project networks’ heterogeneity indexes had smaller variability and 
range (see Figure 1) leading us to suggest that one of the effects of the heterogeneity 
requirements might have been to reduce the variety in the composition of the different 
networks.   
This requirement seems to have been interpreted as a guideline to follow closely 
rather than a minimum threshold, reducing experimentation and leading organisations 
to adhere strictly to the recommended requirement. Once the requirement was 
removed in the second period, organisations experimented with a greater variability in 
network composition, and indeed there is no effect on the average heterogeneity of an 
organisation’s networks in the second period of the average heterogeneity 
requirement imposed in the first.  
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Participants did not appear to consider heterogeneity as a desirable network feature. 
This is in line with previous research showing that organisations prefer to partner with 
similar agents (Caloffi et al., 2015). A certain degree of similarity, which allows 
organisations to develop a common understanding and a number of 
complementarities, has been linked to the creation of stable and successful R&D 
consortia (Bizan, 2003; Häusler et al., 1994; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002). On 
average, any behavioural change seems to be limited to the waves in which these 
requirements were implemented. This is not to say that these policies did not have any 
effect, because the average values can conceal very different individual behaviours. In 
fact, as shown in a more detailed analysis on funded agents’ dyadic relationships, 
individuals seem to have reorganized some of their innovative relationships with 
specific partners in the sense desired by policymakers (Caloffi et al., 2015). However, 
our findings appear to suggest that the imposition of simple requirements on network 
structure is not sufficient to permanently affect an organization’s overall networking 
behaviour over time. This may be particularly true for projects that have small scale 
and short duration, since learning processes leading to behavioural changes within 
organisations may require a long time and the commitment of substantial resources. In 
the case we have presented, most organisations did not receive a large amount of 
funds (the average funding per project in the nine waves was about € 219,000, with a 
minimum funding of € 20,000 and a maximum funding of just over € 3 million), and 
they only collaborated for a short time (the average duration of each project was just 
over 12 months, with a minimum duration of 3 months and a maximum duration of 26 
months).  
It must be noted that the study suffers from some limitations due to data availability. 
One key limitation is that we do not have information about the networking behaviour 
of the participating organisations outside of and beyond the policy programmes 
considered. To fully apprehend the behavioural additionality effects of the policies we 
should compare the organisations’ behaviour with that of a control group of agents 
that did not take part in such interventions. Moreover, we do not have information 
about the actual performance of these networks, in order to analyse whether different 
types of network structures are actually associated with different economic and 
innovation performance. We are currently trying to extend our research in both of 
these directions. 
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7. Conclusion 
This study has allowed us to identify some drawbacks and unintended effects that 
might emerge when attempting to design innovation networks by mandating their size 
and composition. Policymakers’ objectives when setting such requirements were to 
foster interactions between organisations that might not have occurred spontaneously, 
and to provide these organisations with a funded platform (the project) in which to 
test the collaboration. As a consequence of this approach, it might be expected that, 
having appreciated the benefits of collaborating with many different partners, 
participating organisations would have continued to form large and heterogeneous 
networks without the need for further encouragement. However, we have found that 
this was not the case, as once the requirements were removed, organisations returned 
to forming smaller networks, and to using a variety of partnership arrangements 
beyond those mandated by the policy requirements.  
We suggest that the problem with the ex ante definition of very specific requirements, 
such as the detailed prescription of the types of agents that must be included in the 
network, is that, while there is a general consensus on the benefits of heterogeneous 
networks, the nature of the agents that may best contribute to the partnership very 
much depends on the content of the project that the network intends to realize. The 
requirement to involve specific types of organisations may force participants to 
include types of partners that are not needed for the purposes of their project, creating 
unnecessary complications; our findings also suggest that they may discourage them 
from experimenting with different, possibly more appropriate, network compositions, 
a further disadvantage that had not been previously identified and which extends our 
theoretical understanding of the effects of policy requirements. In this case, the 
drawbacks of the heterogeneity requirement appear to have overcome its advantages. 
Looser requirements like the imposition of a minimum number of partners may have 
fewer drawbacks, since they still leave participants with some freedom to design their 
partnership according to their needs, but they still impose additional transaction costs 
and require the project resources to be spread to partners who may not be necessary 
for the project’s success. Therefore, an immediate implication for policy design and 
management is that requirements should be used very sparingly, and in particular very 
specific requirements should be avoided, as they can be counterproductive to the 
objectives to foster network effectiveness, as well as learning and experimentation.  
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Instead, in order to support organisations’ ability to interact with a broader and more 
heterogeneous set of collaborators, aspects that the theory stresses to be of 
fundamental importance, strategies other than the imposition of requirements on 
network structure may be more productive. For example, outreach actions could be 
implemented in order to inform organisations of the benefits of networking with other 
partners and to help them to exploit the opportunities offered by policy programmes. 
Alongside the funding of innovation networks, policymakers could design additional 
measures, in order to foster learning opportunities for the participants, such as 
providing them with opportunities to meet other participating organisations, to engage 
in joint actions, to reflect on their networking experiences and to learn from other 
successful projects, and helping to intermediate communications between 
organisations of different types that find it difficult to work together. This suggests 
that policies for innovation networks should include – besides the selection, funding 
and ex post evaluation of innovation projects – a range of support activities designed 
to foster learning, which could be provided by the policymakers themselves, or 
delegated to experienced innovation intermediaries. 
The findings also illustrate how investigating the behavioural effects of policies can 
bring useful insights, and should become a more frequent component of policy 
evaluation. 
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Appendix 1. Correlation matrix between variables in Models 1 and 2 (n=819) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 1.00                       
2 0.74 1.00                      
3 -0.15 -0.25 1.00                     
4 0.03 0.08 0.17 1.00                    
5 0.05 0.12 -0.15 -0.19 1.00                   
6 0.02 0.02 0.52 0.39 -0.14 1.00                  
7 -0.02 -0.06 -0.20 -0.31 0.17 -0.27 1.00                 
8 0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 -0.23 1.00                
9 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.11 -0.36 -0.06 1.00               
10 -0.07 -0.11 0.36 0.22 -0.06 0.34 -0.23 -0.04 -0.06 1.00              
11 0.15 0.22 -0.10 0.13 -0.08 0.00 -0.34 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 1.00             
12 -0.11 -0.14 0.13 0.17 -0.12 0.06 -0.35 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 1.00            
13 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.32 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 1.00           
14 0.22 0.20 -0.04 -0.04 0.18 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.18 0.01 1.00          
15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 0.09 -0.04 -0.43 1.00         
16 -0.01 0.11 -0.04 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.23 -0.11 1.00        
17 -0.27 -0.29 0.12 -0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 0.08 0.11 -0.24 -0.08 -0.06 1.00       
18 -0.14 -0.24 0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.17 0.00 -0.28 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 1.00      
19 0.13 0.19 -0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.27 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 1.00     
20 0.07 0.10 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 1.00    
21 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.23 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 1.00   
22 -0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.19 0.04 -0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.00  
23 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
  
Key: variables 
1 avghminhet 
2 avgminsize 
3 avgfunding_0205 
4 nprojects_0205 
5 sharefunded_0205 
6              coord_0205 
7              Ent 
8              Opub 
9              LA 
10  SC  
11  LG 
12 Uni 
13 SP 
14 ShareICT 
15 ShareOpto 
16 ShareMech 
17 ShareOrgChem 
18 ShareBiotech  
19 ShareNew 
20 ShareMulti 
21 ShareNano 
22 ShareGeo 
23 ShareOther 
 
  
 34 
Appendix 2. Correlation matrix between variables in Models 3 and 4 (n=201) 
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 1.00 
                      2 0.62 1.00 
                     3 -0.16 -0.13 1.00 
                    4 -0.02 -0.12 0.18 1.00 
                   5 -0.14 -0.07 0.02 -0.08 1.00 
                  6 -0.01 -0.07 0.38 0.56 -0.10 1.00 
                 7 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14 -0.10 0.17 -0.22 1.00 
                8 0.06 0.11 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.16 1.00 
               9 0.01 0.10 -0.10 0.01 -0.16 0.02 -0.27 -0.08 1.00 
              10 -0.13 -0.19 0.26 0.22 -0.07 0.32 -0.23 -0.07 -0.11 1.00 
             11 0.12 0.19 -0.15 -0.22 0.11 -0.13 -0.23 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 1.00 
            12 -0.02 -0.09 0.18 0.06 -0.21 -0.01 -0.29 -0.09 -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 1.00 
           13 -0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.09 -0.25 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 1.00 
          14 0.19 0.17 -0.09 0.10 -0.12 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.11 0.07 1.00 
         15 -0.27 -0.33 0.21 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 -0.13 0.02 -0.07 0.12 -0.11 -0.42 1.00 
        16 -0.04 0.11 0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.17 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.19 -0.17 1.00 
       17 -0.23 -0.15 0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.14 -0.10 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.27 -0.18 -0.09 -0.01 1.00 
      18 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.13 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.29 0.10 -0.12 -0.08 1.00 
     19 0.12 0.21 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.33 -0.11 0.14 0.05 -0.10 1.00 
    20 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.14 0.00 -0.08 0.12 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.06 1.00 
   21 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.14 -0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.14 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 1.00 
  22 -0.24 -0.22 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 0.22 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.16 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.02 1.00 
 23 0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.21 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 1.00 
 
  
Key: variables 
1 avghminhet 
2 avgminsize 
3 nprojects_0608 
4 avgfunding_0608 
5 sharefunded_0608 
6              coord_0608 
7              Ent 
8              Opub 
9              LA 
10  SC  
11  LG 
12 Uni 
13 SP 
14 ShareICT 
15 ShareOpto 
16 ShareMech 
17 ShareOrgChem 
18 ShareBiotech  
19 ShareNew 
20 ShareMulti 
21 ShareNano 
22 ShareGeo 
23 ShareOther 
 
 
